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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the essence of FRG security and defense policy after 
reunification. The first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to 
cooperation of nation states. The second chapter describes German security policy during 
the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany always preferred the 
security of NATO. The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold 
War til 1998 and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. Theoretically Germany had the 
opportunity after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even a 
unequely all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is 
then compared with the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005. 
 The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the 
German armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic 
option, and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the 
European Union (EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to 
determine its influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security 
structure; that was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of 
political demand of the German society as well. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the essence of FRG security and defense policy after 
reunification. The first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to 
cooperation of nation states. The second chapter describes German security policy during 
the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany always preferred the 
security of NATO. The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold 
War til 1998 and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. Theoretically Germany had the 
opportunity after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even a 
unequely all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is 
then compared with the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005. 
 The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German 
armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, 
and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union 
(EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its 
influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that 
was not only the result of the Schroeder administration but a result of political demand of 
the German society as well. 
 
 xiv




A. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
 This study treats the evolution of German foreign and security policy in the past 
two decades after reunification in 1990 with reference to contemporary history and 
international relations theory. As such, this study analyzes the essence of FRG security 
and defense policy in the past in an effort to comprehend the chronology, causes and 
effects of change in German security policy in a time of a diplomatic revolution in 
Europe and the revival of war in the international system in the past twenty years. The 
first section briefly explains the different theoretical approaches to cooperation of nation 
states in the international system. The following second chapter describes German 
security policy during the Cold War and shows the force of continuity that Germany 
always preferred the security of NATO rather than a European development led by 
France. This chapter also reveals that NATO security during the Cold War was in fact 
security provided by the hegemonic leadership of the United States of America (U.S.) 
and the cooperation of the allies who benefited from this system. In addition, the second 
chapter shows how German security policy emancipated itself from the fetters of the cold 
war system during the following four decades. During that period, German security 
policy focused on three main principles. First, German leadership decided to accept 
security from the U.S. in order to be safe against any Soviet threat. A second priority was 
integration into the western society of democratic states in order to regain influence as a 
legitimate European state, which could only be achieved by reconciliation with France. 
The last issue was to achieve the reunification of the two German states under democratic 
conditions and a kind of balance between Adenauer’s western integration/roll back ideal 
of the late 1940’s and the détente imperatives of Willy Brandt in the late 1960’s. These 
factors of policy operated to best effect in 1989-1991, but have become more problematic 
in the recent past. This study seeks to analyze the forces of such change. 
The third chapter explains the German security policy after the Cold War til 1998 
and the advent of the Red-Green coalition. By 1990 all the above mentioned issues of 
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policy were solved and Germany had emerged as the economically strongest and largest 
in population among European countries.  Theoretically Germany had the opportunity 
after regaining total sovereignty to decide between NATO and EU, or even an unequal 
all-German security strategy. This development of the Kohl administration is then 
compared with the last chapter, the Schroeder cabinet of 1998-2005. 
This third chapter investigates the extent to which the European and the NATO 
security pillar developed, and German reactions during this social democratic time--
continuity or structural change after reunification on one hand and differences in the 
political parties on the other hand as all these apply to German foreign, security and 
defense policies. 
 The last chapter describes the strategic and operational capabilities of the German 
armed forces in order to demonstrate that a German-only path is an unrealistic option, 
and that Germany is dependent on a deep integration into NATO and the European Union 
(EU). Finally, the role of German society is investigated in order to determine its 
influence on the choice to pursue a more independent European security structure; that 
the decision to develop security with EU was not only the result of the Schroeder 
administration but a result of political demand of the German society as well. 
B. THE NEOREALIST AND THE NEOINSTITUTIONALIST THEORY 
From a theoretical point of view, two scholarly analyses investigate cooperation 
and integration policy of states. First, the neorealist point of view will be investigated in 
order to explain the probable result which should have occurred after the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist. Second, the neo liberal point of view will be explained in order to make 
assumptions how Germany under this theory should have developed in the post Cold War 
period. Both theories, therefore, will provide the basic foundation for the two possible 
paths after 1990: the one which favors NATO and therefore maintenance of U.S. 
influence; the second, a more European security dimension due to the lack of threat 
which only could be countered by the U.S. The third and last option would be a re- 
nationalization which would provide Germany with the most actionable liberty in foreign 
affairs but might restrain its influence on other states within NATO and/or the EU. 
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 From the neorealist perspective states are the only relevant actors in an anarchic 
system. Due to the lack of any overarching structure which rules and regulates states’ 
behavior the states live in a self-help system. This system is based on the idea that states 
have to concentrate on power and security to ensure their sovereignty and integrity. 
Society, economy, and administration do not play a relevant role due to the fact that only 
external factors influence state behavior.1 The external factor of influence is mainly 
power in a military sense. Therefore states are in a constant rivalry to gain power to 
ensure their own survival. This pursuit for power is seen as a zero sum game, where the 
gains of one state are always at the expense of another. Due to the fact that no state can 
be sure about the intentions of the other states all live in a security dilemma. This forces 
states to build alliances in order to compensate their lack of security in the form of power. 
In the situation of NATO, the U.S. is the hegemonic power with overwhelming 
capabilities. But this hegemony only accepts this situation as long as its relative costs for 
cooperation are less than its relative gains in this alliance. During the Cold War the U.S. 
national interest needed the European territory as a security buffer and as a territory for 
own nuclear and conventional forces for any possible Soviet attack. The current EU 
countries and especially Germany were the frontline of the Cold War. For Germany, the 
situation after the Second World War as a defeated country required two security goals: 
first, to receive security under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and second, to be integrated into 
the western societies in order to regain political legitimacy as a political actor. From a 
realist point of view the collapse of the Soviet Union with which the Soviet threat ceased 
to exist, and the democratization of former communist countries to Germany’s east would 
change Germany’s requirement for outside security as well as unconditional integration.  
With the democratization of former communist countries east of Germany it would gain a 
security buffer to its eastern border, and the Soviet/Russian threat was not only weakened 
by the collapse of its empire but now physically further removed  from German territory. 
 
                                                 
1 Neorealist school: Hans J Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, brief edition (revised by Kenneth 
Thompson, Mac Graw-Hill, 1985; chapter originally drafted for 2nd ed., 1954), ch.1: “A Realist Theory of 
International Politics”; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York 1979): Chapter 5-6. 
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 The neo-institutional perspective adopts some parts from the neorealist school but 
differs in its assumption about state behavior. It acknowledges that interdependence in a 
more and more globalized world can not be managed by one state itself. Therefore all 
states which are part of an alliance can be better off because they are able to make 
relative gains in an alliance. This is contrary to the idea of the neorealist school where 
only zero sum gains exist. However, from a neo-institutional perspective, all can be better 
off even without a hegemon because they form an alliance in order to combine their 
capabilities in order to maximize their influence. Furthermore, the security dilemma gets 
reduced by the fact that their cooperation is trust-building. It enhances transparency, 
provides information about the aims of the member states, and therefore makes the 
alliance durable as long as the members share the same interests and the cost / benefit 
analysis is positive.2 
Germany is left with a difficult question: how far to support EU development as 
an institution with an own identity running on its own steam, and which might once 
replace NATO? 
                                                 
2 Neoinstitutionalist school: Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy, (Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 78-109; Robert O. Keohane, 
“Institutional Theory in international Relations,” in Michael Brecher and Frank Harveys, eds., Millennial 
Reflections on International Studies (University of Michigan Press, 2002). 
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II. GERMAN SECURITY DURING THE COLD WAR 
A. REAPPRAISAL OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM 
 The way Germany developed after the Cold War was mainly defined by the 
United States of America (U.S.). Therefore the relationship between Germany and its 
neighbors and later towards NATO is often a question of the relationship towards the 
U.S. The United States of America became not only an occupying force after the Second 
World War but also the main pillar for Western Germany’s security. This policy first 
unfolded before entry into NATO in 1955 and later, as an integral part of NATO until the 
climax of unity in 1990.  A cultural similarity linked both states together. Since 1683, 
more than seven million Germans migrated into the United States, and nearly one fourth 
of U.S. citizens of today are of German heritage. In addition, and surely more important 
for this analysis, more than 16 million U.S. military personnel served in Germany during 
the Cold War of whom Elvis Presley is perhaps the most famous and the most indicative 
of the virtues of this fact.3 However, the U.S.’s postwar relationship with Germany began 
under the hard terms4 of occupation, which after a year and a half months changed due to 
the different policies of the four occupying nations. The Marshall Plan of 1947 and the 
new cooperation directive JCS 1779 both marked the beginning of a new relationship 
between the U.S. and Germany that led steadily from hostility to entente.5 
A further change could be recognized by the telegram of George F. Kennan in 
February of 1946. Containment of the totalitarian ideology of communism was the 
necessary center of gravity which finally made the division of Germany necessary but 
also brought Germans and Americans together in a common purpose. As Kennan stated 
“…dividing Germany was not an end in itself, it was the only way to prevent the 
                                                 
3 Gregor Schild, “Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” Information zur politischen Bildung (2003): 
3. 
4 JCS 1067, the fraternization ban conveying the message of collective guilt to Germans and serving as 
a security measure for the remainder of the war. Petra Goedde, GI’s and Germans. Culture, Gender, and 
Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (Yale University Press, 2003), 43. 
5 JCS 1779 emphasized German American cooperation and economic reconstruction. In: Petra 
Goedde, GI’s and Germans. Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (Yale University Press, 
2003), 124. 
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Russians from controlling all of Germany at the time.”6  German reunification was 
postponed perhaps forever at the expense of security on one hand and for the integration 
of West Germany into the Euro-Atlantic sphere on the other hand. Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer as the leader of the Christian Democratic Union accepted this U.S. lead 
development and supported the unconditional integration into the west despite objections 
of the other political figures intent on the maintenance of unity and the return to the 
policies of the past.7 In April 1948 the European Recovery Program supported the 
economic reconstruction of West Germany; it was the helping hand of the U.S. which 
reached out to Germany in order to end the isolation of West Germany in western 
Europe, and to end the contraction of German industry. West Germany had to be returned 
to economic strength because France, Denmark and other western European states were 
dependent on a strong economic West Germany, which functioned as the center of 
gravity for western European states economies and for the U.S. in mainly military 
issues.8 The Soviet response was the Berlin blockade in June 1948 which made it more 
than obvious that a new era of east-west confrontation had begun. The Berlin blockade 
tried to force the western occupation forces out of Berlin so that the Soviet Union could 
have total control of the eastern part of Germany.  Again it was the U.S. Luftbruecke or 
airlift of President Truman which fashioned the umbilical cord between the western 
democratic state and the small outpost of Berlin. For more than one year Berlin was 
dependent on this airlift. West Germany unarmed and still almost wholly in ruins left 
behind the authoritarian system of the Third Reich. West Germany was weak, and still an 
outcast among its European neighbors. Reconciliation on the basis of common values 
was the other issue for the West German administration that was of major importance, 
especially this principle was central to relations across the Rhine, for traditionally France, 
which had suffered more than any other country under the German pursuit for world 
power during the First and Second World Wars. “Not security with, but security against, 
                                                 
6 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions of Europe (Cambridge University Press, paperback 
Edition 1996), 207. 
7 “Adenauer’s primary aim was to integrate West Germany institutionally with the political West.” 
Dan, Dinner, America in the eyes of the Germans (Frankfurt: Vito von Eichborn Verlag, 1993), 115. 
8 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books USA, 2006), 98. 
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a future Germany was the main issue of the western states.”9 For the German 
administration reconciliation with France, unconditional west-integration under U.S. 
leadership and reunification of Germany were the main issues which they hoped to 
tackle. FRG statecraft thus had to form a triangular relationship between the West 
German state, the US and the French IV Republic. Such statecraft was never especially 
easy, but it was efficacious. This fact bears keeping in mind in view of the events prior to 
1990, as well as those thereafter and especially those of the more recent past. 
 When in June 1950 the communist North Korea attacked the South, the U.S. 
administration intensified its semi-thought through plans to rearm Germany, a move that 
alarmed the French and anticipated ongoing Soviet efforts in their eastern zone of 
occupation to create an armed force there. “The United States could not fight a war 
against the USSR in Europe without the cooperation of its allies, who provided the real 
estate from which the war would be launched. The newly formed NATO could only 
poorly hold any position on the European continent without a defensive line farther to the 
east. This fact was particularly true for West Germany, which, as the front-line state and 
the main theater of a potential east-west war, had to permit use of its territory for NATO 
purposes.”10 Korea was a shock to the west, and the rearmament of West Germany 
became necessary to share the burden of a secure Europe. However, the West German 
society after the years of the Second World War was exhausted and tired of any military 
attempt, and projected a mentality of “without me.” West Germans were more interested 
in “…getting real estate rather than participating in any bloody global adventures 
again.”11 Or they simply wished to live in peace and to have a full stomach and an intact 
family. But besides this mood Germans feared the Russian threat and the anti 
communism of the pre-1945 era sensibly extended into the 1950. The weight of the past 
was insurmountable. Germans had twice carried war to Russia, although Russia had 
invaded in 1914. As the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union declined, the 
                                                 
9 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis 
Gerhard Schroeder (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 66. 
10 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among democracies, The European Influence on US foreign 
policy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 23 
11 Harald Steffahn, Helmut Schmidt. (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2004), 66. 
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transatlantic relationship between Germany and the U.S. grew proportionately better and 
more important and central to the purpose of Federal German statecraft and strategy. The 
foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and the abolishment of the 
western occupation charter or Besatzungsstatut in 1955 marked the end of the Second 
World War and the beginning of the Cold War era. 
The Federal Republic  of Germany, a former enemy of the U.S.,  quickly became 
an ally in the containment politics of the U.S. against the communist Soviet Union. 
Unlike the failed statecraft of 1919-1923, the U.S. accepted security responsibility for the 
future of western and central Europe to prevent the Soviet attempt to spread their 
totalitarian ideology to the west. West Germany therefore accepted the fact that a 
reunification could not likely be achieved under democratic conditions or those of 
alignment with the maritime democracies. At this time the German administration 
thought that German liberty without reunification would be the only positive possibility 
at least until some distant time in which the Soviet Union would regurgitate what it had 
recently engulfed. A reunification without liberty would be the result if West Germany 
would have turned away from its western allies, and would be reunified as a neutral state 
(a possibility in 1952) not strong enough to escape the Soviet influence that would have 
damned the fate of Germany to a neutral Germany’s future.12 Germany was dependent 
for its own security on a strong transatlantic relationship towards the U.S. as the main 
power in the western hemisphere. West Germany therefore accepted the price it had to 
pay. National reunification became more and more unrealistic. 
However, the Korean War accelerated and supported the politics of Adenauer. It 
changed the German willingness to contribute a share in the common western defense, In 
part responding to the U.S. influence to support France materially and financially,  only if 
France would support a more European development without further hampering the U.S. 
German policy.  This phenomenon reflected the triangular policy of integration of the 
FRG in the West.  Only the influence of the U.S. restrained France’s attempt to prevent 
the  West German integration into the west during these years in terms acceptable to a 
                                                 
12 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis 
Gerhard Schroeder (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 69. 
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West German population wary of politics generally. . At the time Germany had little 
influence in foreign politics and could only rely on support from the U.S.13  Adenauer 
and the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles shared a special relationship, and 
Adenauer saw the U.S. as the only guarantor for peace and liberty for Germany.14 With 
the process of democratization of West Germany, President  Harry Truman and thereafter 
Dwight D. Eisenhower transformed a former enemy with limited democratic experience 
and a militaristic past into a stable democracy willing to support the ideas of peace and 
democracy. 
 Germany in return for U.S. ensured security and economical support affirmed 
U.S. political and economic dominance. However, as the economic recovery of West 
Germany progressed, it was less and less willing to accept the position of a subordinate of 
the U.S. When the U.S. demanded that Germany take a larger share in the financial costs 
of U.S.-stationed troops in Germany in the late-1950s, Germany only followed this 
demand after serious pressure from the U.S that grew under the Kennedy administration.. 
In October 1961 Germany signed the Offset-Treaty by which Germany was compelled to 
buy weapons for their own forces in the U.S. in order to compensate the  balance of 
payments U.S. deficit that weakened the dollar. 
B. INTEGRATION INTO THE WESTERN SECURITY POLICY 
 The security strategy of the West in the middle 1950s was marked by the idea of 
massive nuclear retaliation under U.S. hegemony. This strategy changed during the 1960s 
into flexible response with a major impact on the FRG.  Initially, the concept of massive 
retaliation was intended to counter a Soviet attack whether conventional or nuclear, with 
a massive counter attack with nuclear weapons. The Bundeswehr had adapted to this 
principle after the Truman administration’s ideal of a massive conventional and nuclear 
build up had become obsolete with the Korean War.  The following concept of flexible 
                                                 
13 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis 
Gerhard Schroeder (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 67. 
14 Gregor Schild, “Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” Information zur politischen Bildung 
(2003): 7. 
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response (1961-1991) was based on the idea to react with means similar to the attack of 
the Soviet Union at which ever level of force was appropriate. 
 Both strategies put West and East Germany in a difficult position as the chief 
battle field. West Germany was dependent on the nuclear protection of the United States, 
and any kind of war could have caused the destruction of the western as well as the 
eastern German territory. Therefore two mains issues were of main importance for West 
Germany in NATO. First, that a war would have to be avoided by credible deterrence and 
second, that everything should be done to avoid any decoupling of the U.S. from Europe 
such that central Europe was nothing more than a shooting range.  Otherwise a nuclear 
war of the superpowers on German territory might have been possible. 
 The U.S. administration during the 1940s was in the favorable position to be the 
only ones with nuclear weapons. This fact finally changed at the end of the 1940’s but 
did not change the U.S. strategy to counter the Soviet threat put in hand with NSC-68. A 
similar deterrence with conventional capabilities was unaffordable due to its high costs. 
In the mid-1950s the Eisenhower administration reinforced the nuclear arsenal with 7000 
tactical nuclear weapons in Germany and flirted with the idea of a sharp reduction of US 
troops in Europe.15 
 The Berlin crisis in 1961 finally showed that the two superpowers were satisfied 
with the status quo and made the way for the operationalization of Flexible Response on 
a NATO-wide scale, with considerable implications for the FRG. The building of the 
Berlin wall made it obvious that a frontal attack by the Soviet Union was less probable. 
However, an adjustment of the western strategy had to be made because the politics of 
the Soviet Union placed a high value on making life as hard as possible for the western 
states. The U.S. acceptance of the demarcation between the western and the eastern block 
changed the NATO strategy of massive retaliation into flexible response, and made any 
German hope for reunification seemingly impossible. Security and stability seemed to be 
more important than the question of any German reunification. Adenauer’s proposal to 
the German people that the unconditional link with the west would finally lead to the 
                                                 
15 Gregor Schild, “Deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen,” Information zur politischen Bildung 
(2003): 8. 
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reunification proved to be far away at this time. However, West Germany accepted the 
diminished possibility of reunification, because any possible reunification would not have 
been achieved under democratic circumstances. These events ushered in the openings of 
diplomacy of the middle -1960s that later became known as the Ostpolitik ( i.e. eastern 
policy) of the social liberal era,  1969-1982. 
 The fear of a possible nuclear attack by the Soviet Union decreased. But many 
Germans felt that flexible response would invite a Soviet attack on German soil because 
of its lack of deterrence. The Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss adhered to this view, 
as did the elderly Adenauer.  With the Berlin Wall established a status quo was built 
where only a political solution could avoid future war. Security and stability became the 
most admired aims for the west. Making an issue of German reunification might have 
destabilized this status quo and therefore was not of major concern to the western powers. 
Adenauer had to accept that his unconditional link to the west leading to the reunification 
of both German states had been diminished. West Germany had to accept its dependence 
on the U.S. and therefore could not expect any support for its pursuit of one German 
state. The strong transatlantic link forced and supported by Adenauer’s policy became the 
obstacle to any solution of the German problem of reunification. “The Wall ended 
Berlin’s career as the crisis zone of world and European affairs. …After November 1961 
Berlin ceased to matter and West Berlin began its steady descent into political 
irrelevance.”16 
One year after the construction of the Berlin Wall the second major crisis of the 
Cold War appeared, when the Soviet Union began establishing intermediate ballistic 
missiles in Cuba. After a sea-blockade of the U.S. and secret bargaining the Soviet Union 
finally withdrew their nuclear arsenal. The German chancellor Adenauer supported the 
U.S. when he stated that “we should consider all possible actions for elimination of 
Castro regime and Soviet influence in Cuba….”17 Adenauer was willing to put Berlin at 
stake for the maintenance of western security. Both superpowers had finally agreed on 
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their spheres of influence and respected the marked territory. Stabilization rather than 
change became the main issue of the U.S.  The riots in the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) in 1953, in Poland in 1956, in Hungary 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 did 
not result in a  U.S. riposte in central Europe that would interfere with the Soviet status 
quo. In June 1963 the Soviet Union and the U.S. established a hot-line, and one month 
later signed the test-ban treaty which besides other objectives prohibited any German 
pursuit of nuclear arms. “The West Germans somewhat resentfully accepted the veto on 
German nuclear arms, just as they had accepted the division of Berlin, as the price of a 
continued American presence.”18 The situation between the two major powers in Europe, 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, became static and remained so until the late-1970s. 
This state of affairs did not support the solution of the German problem of 
reunification but led to the beginning of the Entspannungspolitik or eased relations 
between the west and the east in the early 1960s. Germany became more emancipated in 
its foreign policy,  a result of the American change in foreign policy which became less 
centered on Europe. After the situation in Europe became more stable the U.S. turned 
their main interest to Asia. The U.S. thought that their reliability in Europe as a 
democratic ally would decrease if they would not support South Vietnam against the 
communist North. In the process Europe and especially Germany had lost its position as 
the center of gravity. Security for West Germany was provided by the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, Germany was integrated into the NATO structure in 1955 and began to arm in 
1956, and reconciliation with France was a long term process which began in the early 
1950s and was finally signed in 1963 with the Élysée Treaty. The German pursuit for 
reunification had become an issue only for West Germany and lost much of its force. The 
planning staff in the inner-German ministry stopped work for such reunification in 1966 
in the spirit of the times. 
In 1969 the period of conservative administrations of Konrad Adenauer19, Ludwig 
Erhard20, and Kurt Georg Kiesinger21 was succeeded by the first Social-liberal 
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administration of Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. Brandt 
and his Foreign Minister Scheel feared that the Hallstein Doctrine22, (i.e. that the FRG 
was the only legitimate German state and any nation that recognized the GDR would 
cease to have diplomatic relations with Bonn,) would isolate West Germany’s foreign 
policy. As the former mayor of Berlin during the time the Berlin Wall was built, –a 
monument to the pursuit by the two superpowers for stasis in Europe--Brandt was 
disenchanted by the behaviour the U.S. had shown during 1961 and afterwards. Any 
future reunification of the two German states had to be initiated by Germans willing to 
pursue a long term strategy. To achieve this aim he envisioned a change through 
rapprochement. This was similar to the vision of the former U.S. president John F. 
Kennedy23. Brandt envisioned a policy of reconciliation with the east as a comparative 
part of the west integration which was accomplished by Konrad Adenauer.24 Coexistence 
should be transferred into a relationship where the west would be affiliated with the east. 
However, his attempt to ease the German-German relations could only be accomplished 
by negotiations with the Soviet Union, which caused distrust in the western alliance even 
though Brandt contributed to the U.S. policy to relieve the stresses in Europe. Brandt 
declared that the Oder-Neisse border was not open for further discussion. Both politicians 
Richard Nixon and Willy Brandt preferred the policy of détente. It was the success of the 
German–U.S. relations which enabled the politics of détente to take form in the treaty of 
Moscow in August 1970, the Warsaw treaty in December 1970, and the four-power 
agreement in September 1971. Germany became emancipated and the U.S. 
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Commanding Officer of the Fast Patrol Boat PT 109 in the Pacific during the Second World War. 
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administration demanded and supported the attempt for regional responsibility.25 But 
only after intensive consultations between the western allies and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Washington, Paris, and London became aware that Ostpolitik had nothing to 
do with so called Finlandization or restraining allies’ interests in German affairs. This 
German vision was not only a socialist vision of change between the two German states. 
It was also supported by radical step of the conservative parties in Germany which made 
the ratification possible by abstention from voting.26 The reference point for this German 
vision can be found in the idea of Kulturnation or cultural nation of common language, 
culture and history, rather than in any anti-Americanism of the West German parties. 
That is, the grudging acceptance of the division of Europe also rested on a bipartisan 
sense of responsibility for Germans in the GDR that argued for the ideal of 
transformation of policy through a process of Annaeherung, or drawing closer despite the 
barbed wire and machine guns of the inner German border.  Eventually, with the US – 
Soviet meetings in 1972, 1973, and 1974 and SALT I on nuclear missles, both 
superpowers contractually affirmed the policy of détente.27 The U.S. and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) affirmed the actual borders, especially in Europe, and by 
doing this superseded the idea of détente. Germany emerged into a position as a mediator 
of American western European policy. Evidence can be found in the statement of German 
Foreign Minister Scheel who stated that “… any attempt to organize a Europe against the 
will of America will not gain German approval.”28 By supporting U.S. post war policies, 
Germany transitioned from a vanquished nation to one of Europe’s most important states 
as an economic and security partner. 
Domestic political problems finally overcame Chancellor Willy Brandt and the 
social democrat Helmut Schmidt became the fifth chancellor of the FRG in 1974.  
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Schmidt was a former German Luftwaffe Officer during the Second World War and a 
reserve officer of the Bundeswehr, and signified how the SPD had reached out to such 
men in their millions in the 1950s and also symbolized how the German working class 
embraced the social market economy. Schmidt also symbolized how the SPD had 
embraced the Bundeswehr in the 1950s as well. Due to the Soviet rearmament Schmidt 
believed in the necessity of strong armed forces,  which in the German case, should be 
deeply linked to the transatlantic organization. 29 Different from the Jimmy Carter30 
administration of 1976-1981 Schmidt envisioned that the Soviet bloc could only be 
limited under two conditions: first, that a conventional Soviet attack could be 
successfully stopped at the actual borders, and second, that détente could only work if the 
Soviets could be convinced that any attack would trigger a counterattack on Soviet soil. 
For this version of détente to be persuasive, deployment of Pershing II and Cruise 
Missiles were best suited.31 Schmidt saw a huge threat in the rearmament of the Soviet 
Union, which established more and more Euro-strategic SS-20 Missiles in the GDR 
which mainly threatened Europe, as the U.S. was out of reach of these medium range 
missiles. Schmidt argued that the U.S. and Europe should not be decoupled by the Soviet- 
and U.S. Salt agreement concerning long-range missiles. The U.S. president Jimmy 
Carter finally moved towards this threat assessment, and the NATO double treaty in 1979 
ensured the replacement of Pershing I-A by Pershing II missiles as well as Ground 
Launched Cruise Missiles . A new equilibrium was achieved when the detente politics of 
Carter in his first years shifted to a more weapons-dependent security stance in the wake 
of the Afghan invasion by the Soviets in December 1979. Schmidt was aware that a 
secure Europe could only be achieved under the U.S.-led NATO, and he was willing to 
put his own political career at stake in order to station U.S. Pershing and GLCM missiles 
in Germany.32 Schmidt’s attempt to achieve both, a policy of détente and the rearmament 
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discussion within NATO ( in accord with the Harmel doctrine of 1967), finally weakened 
the support of his own party by 1982  in addition to problems with the liberal  Free 
Democrats on tax issues. However, Schmidt was right--that any policy of détente was 
only possible under the condition of a military equilibrium between west and east in 
accorded with NATO policy in hand since the late-1960s.33 
The sixth German Chancellor Helmut Kohl took office in 1982, and the 
conservative German Chancellor and the conservative U.S. President Ronald Reagan 
made transatlantic politics slightly easier. However, due to the Vietnam experience and 
Reagan’s nuclear ideas as well as his call to tear down the Berlin Wall (1987), the 
German people were suspicious of the conservative U.S. president and his aggressive 
politics, forcing rearmament with Cruise missiles, inter-medium ballistic missiles and the 
development of the SDI program. Again, as the relationship between the two 
superpowers weakened, the relationship between West Germany and the U.S. improved. 
Reagan forced an ideological and economic confrontation with the Soviets. This strategy 
finally exhausted the Soviet Union and its economic capabilities, and triggered the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Reagan’s policy of rearmament threatened any solution of 
the German problem, but it weakened the Soviet Union and finally caused its collapse as 
the second superpower. 
The administration change in the U.S. in 1989 when George Herbert Walker Bush 
took over from Reagan came at the same time Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 
recognized that his policy of Perestroika and Glasnost also made a closer link to the west 
necessary. Germany was one of the countries where the Soviet Union hoped to find a 
valuable partner for financial and economic help and trade. This course of open door to 
the west also had an effect on the GDR, which through improvements in economic well 
being, liberty, and elements of a democratic system had more and more in common with 
the west.34 
                                                 
33 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis 
Gerhard Schroeder (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 261. 
34 Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis 
Gerhard Schroeder (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 2004, Second Edition), 261. 
 17
It was the support of the U.S. which finally together with the acceptance of the Soviet 
Union made reunification possible. France as well as the United Kingdom (UK) feared 
any German reunification, and tried to oppose or at least to slow down this process, but 
did not have as weighty a say as the U.S. 
C. GERMAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY ‘TIL 1989 
The creation of the two German states, the FRG and the GDR, was mainly 
accomplished by the will and terms of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both states 
followed the ideological framework of their hegemonic leaders. For both German states 
the process of reconstruction was without any historical link to former times. The western 
part of Germany developed under NATO due to the fact that the U.S. was the 
unconditional leader of NATO during the Cold War, and Germany developed under U.S. 
leadership. What was unachievable during the Weimar Republic--the pursuit for welfare, 
economic development, security, and integration in the west--became reality after nearly 
one decade. Germany evolved in its political behaviour, and besides territorial security, 
reunification became an issue of high priority. But the Soviet threat to western Germany 
could only be balanced by NATO, or to be more specific, by a close link to the U.S. as 
the hegemonic power of the western hemisphere. Reconciliation with France was 
achieved in the decades which followed the Elysee Treaty. What could not develop 
during the decades of the Cold War was a national identity. The contrary ideologies of 
their occupation powers made a common political development for the divided 
Germanies impossible.  Both states were the result of rational power politics and were 
partly founded to avoid a Nationalstaat or national state of its historical heritage.  
Nationality as national interest is the base of any foreign policy. The period of the Cold 
War shows that the FRG followed the idea to say mass and to balance its policy between 
the two superpowers. The Soviet threat and the U.S. nuclear umbrella constrained the 
German security policy. Only NATO could provide what was necessary to ensure 
economic, social, political and cultural development. All these ties became less important 
after reunification and the full sovereignty that was achieved in 1990-1991. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact opened the gate even wider for a new German 
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security policy. The framework of German security and defense changed totally. 
Germany as the heartland of Europe, economically strong and reunified, had achieved its 
aims of the Cold War, and its geo-strategic situation had turned Germany into the most 
important country of continental Europe. Being in this situation provided opportunities 
which were unforeseeable during previous decades. But how has the security and defense 
of Germany developed since reunification in the past decade and a half? Did it prefer a 
more European security and defense policy at the expense of NATO, did it renationalize 
and take a more independent or German way, or did it maintain in linking its security to 
the long, successful, and reliable security of NATO? The following pages seek answers 
to these questions. 
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III. THE KOHL ADMINISTRATION AFTER REUNIFICATION 
A. EU OR NATO, CIVILIAN POWER OR REALPOLITIK? 
With the reunification in October 1990  German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated 
that “we know that from now on we [the Germans] have to take over more responsibility 
in the international community.”35 Only one year later, after Iraq had invaded and 
occupied Kuwait and the U.S. prepared to operate under a UN resolution to free Kuwait, 
German Chancellor Kohl stated that “...our American and European allies should know 
that they are not alone in the fight of the international community to ensure global rights 
and the enforcement of peace in Kuwait. Germany will strongly support them.”36 This 
point of view was not only legitimate but also expected by the allies. Germany with more 
than 80 million citizens and its economic strength was expected to take over more 
responsibility in military terms in a world that somehow failed to embrace the Kantian 
ideal in the 1990s. 
Would Germany contribute troops and support the UN and the U.S. in an extra 
national operation when German politicians believed that this was not in congruence with 
the German Constitution? The anticipated answer came in the form of $17 billion USD 
for the US-led war against Iraq in 1991. This political behavior may be traced to the mid 
1980s when the German Minister of Justice  Juergen Schmude received the order from 
the German Parliament to rule how far German Armed Forces would be allowed to 
operate outside the assigned area of NATO even under a UN resolution in light the 
strictures of the German Baisc Law. Schmude stated that any operation outside NATO 
would be prohibited by the German Constitution’s Article 87a.37  This  clause was also 
the general point of view of the German politicians and reflects that Germany after 1945 
                                                 
35 Helmut Kohl, “Botschaft zum Tag der deutschen Einheit an alle Regierungen der Welt,“ Europa 
Archiv Jahrgang 45. (1990): 541. 
36 Helmut Kohl, “Regierungserklaerung from 01.03.1991, German Parliament, 
http://www.phoenix.de/51166.htm, access 04.01.2007. 
37 The Article 87.A. states that German Forces main purpose is defense of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, any other mission is only allowed if not contrary to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/recht/de/gg/, accessed 04.01.2007 
 20
had developed into a civilian power which rejects the idea of Machtpolitik and the use of 
force.  This fact was disappointing especially for the U.S., which after German 
reunification had stated that future German-U.S. cooperation would be characterized as  
“partners in leadership.” 
For national reasons, this “hands-off” stance toward the Middle East conflict did 
not extend to more local European territorial challenges that emerged around the same 
time. When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed, Slovenia and Croatia 
pronounced their independence on June 25, 1991.  One year after its own reunification 
Germany was still fully aware of its good fortune and the necessary support from the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. to achieve this long-wished–for aim, and supported these two 
small countries in south eastern Europe.38 Their attempt at liberty was abolished by the 
immediate intervention of the Yugoslavian Army. Interestingly, Germany had 
acknowledged the general agreement of the EU not to acknowledge any of these states’ 
attempt for sovereignty before a general regulation could be achieved.  Germany was 
perceived by many European states as choosing its own way. Some European countries 
feared that this German attempt was the first sign of a German path of power politics 
without consulting its NATO allies or the EU members. 
The reason behind German support for sovereignty in Slovenia and Croatia was 
an attempt to change the situation of the internal Yugoslavian conflict. Germany hoped 
by supporting the pursuit for sovereignty to be able to forestall any further attack by 
Yugoslav military forces. By acknowledging their sovereignty, any further attack would 
not be an internal political issue but an attack on a sovereign country.  However, an 
agreement with the EU had been achieved well ahead of the German acknowledgment.  
This   strategy was further fuelled by the German-French attempt to transform the 
German-French Brigade, commissioned in 1990, into the Eurocorps.39  The bilateral 
meeting of France and Germany in La Rochelle in May 1992 was an example which 
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should have alleviated concern about any unilateral German path or preferred European 
development. Both France and Germany agreed to transform the German-French brigade 
into the Euro Corps, which would be suitable for peace-building and peace-securing 
missions under UN resolutions. Its own military staff was established in Strasbourg in 
October 1992, and one year later Belgium joined the Eurocorps.  This development was 
criticized especially by Washington because the U.S. feared that these participating 
countries would step by step disengage from the NATO structure. The transformation of 
the German-French Brigade should not be mistaken as a sign of a German willingness to 
prefer a more European defense pillar. It has to be seen as the total opposite. Frictions 
occurred between France and Germany during the La Rochelle meeting in May 1992 
because the former German-French Brigade was neither an integral part of NATO nor 
had there been any attempt to define its relations towards NATO.  German support for the 
development of a European army was linked to the idea that it would have the effect of 
bringing France closer to NATO.40 Since 1966 France was no longer a member of the 
Integrated Military Organization (IMO) of NATO, and attempted to loosen Germany’s 
ties towards NATO.  Finally France did agree to the establishment of formal links 
between the Franco-German corps and NATO only with the condition that Germany was 
not willing to establish a Eurocorps without any link towards NATO. The doubly hated 
German troops, assigned to NATO as well as to the Eurocorps, are an integral part of the 
Eurocorps. The Eurocorps itself can be subordinated to the Senior Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) which is always an American officer. In fact, Germany did not loosen 
its ties towards NATO but induced France to get closer to NATO again. France finally 
had to acknowledge that after the end of the Cold War NATO survived, and it did so 
because states like Germany were not willing to develop a single European defense pillar. 
From that point of view Germany maintained its pursuit for a balanced security policy 
between NATO and the EU and sought to avoid renationalization. 
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In sum, the German administration under Helmut Kohl followed the Adenauer 
policy of unconditional western security integration with the west. Surely this policy 
could not be done without France, in general, but even Kohl favored an even closer 
multilateral integration. During this administration the German armed forces were linked 
to more bilateral and multilateral forces than ever before in the history of Germany. In 
October 1992 the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps were established. Its multinational 
Command Staff was based in Bielefeld in Germany and led by a British general. Besides 
one British tank division and one light infantry division, two multinational divisions of 
German, Dutch, Greek, Italian, and Turkish troops would increase the force to a total of 
nearly 100,000 soldiers. This Corps was established for the territorial defense of NATO 
but can also be assigned under UN resolution for NATO out of area missions.41  
Furthermore, a German-American Corps stationed in Heidelberg, an American-
German Corps stationed in Ulm, a German-Dutch Corps in Muenster, and a German-
Danish Corps stationed in Rendsburg was established. In addition, Germany  remained a 
member of the NATO Airborne Early Warning System E3A which planes and crews 
were stationed in Geilenkirchen in Germany.  
This development was a decisive  point because it abolished any French 
assumption that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the days of NATO’s survival were 
numbered, and that Germany could finally lean towards a French-led European defense 
pillar.  Re nationalization was in fact not observed in the behavior of Germany but in the 
behavior of several NATO allies. The U.S. reduced its troops in Europe from 350,000 in 
1989 to 100,000 by 1994; most of these divisions had been stationed in Germany.42 
Canada, without previous consultation of its allies, stated in February 1992 that they 
would withdraw their troops by 1994.43 
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 The strategy for collective self defense of western Europe differed from nation to 
nation according to the interests of each. The British intent was to use the Western 
European Union (WEU) for “military actions outside the NATO treaty.”44 By this intent 
the British wanted to develop a mission for the WEU which would be complementary to 
NATO. France  tried to develop a farther reaching goal. France considered the WEU as a 
fully established political union which as every other political union should take care of 
its own defense. Therefore the member states of the WEU had to achieve a compromise 
about the tasks and the integration of the WEU. It had to be a compromise of the euro-
skeptical British and the NATO skeptical French. In June 1992 these member states met 
at the Petersberg in Bonn in order to reactivate the WEU. During this meeting the 
members agreed that the WEU should develop military capabilities for: humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking. The military units of the WEU which should execute these tasks 
should be “employed in conjunction with their contribution to common defense in 
agreement with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified 
Brussels treaty.”45 Furthermore the WEU defined its decision “as the means to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”46 This compromise is congruent with the 
German attempt that any European development should be complementary to NATO and 
not diminish NATO into irrelevance. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated, “It is 
no longer a question of either-or, but of one alongside the other.”47 
 To ensure that any development would be complementary and not a duplication of 
existing capabilities of NATO, the NATO members decided to develop the Combined 
Joint Task Force concept (CJTF). This concept “launched in 1993, was designed to allow 
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for NATO-WEU cooperation for Petersberg-type tasks.”48 In “1994 – 1996 NATO 
endorsed steps to build an ESDI that was separable but not separate from NATO to give 
the European allies the ability to act in crises where NATO as a whole was not 
engaged.”49 Therefore Germany as member of the WEU as well as member of NATO 
ensures that NATO has a higher priority, and that any decision must first be made within 
NATO. This complements the fact that if NATO does not agree to execute its own 
operation it would not override its consensus decision making process  to loan assets to 
the WEU. This shows that the Europeans are dependent on NATO assets for more 
intensives operation. This ensures U.S. control and avoids any duplication of European 
assets, which then would constrain the small defense budgets of the European countries. 
 With the development of the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991, the transatlantic 
alliance changed to adjust to the new environmental security challenges of the post Cold 
War era. As NATO had been able to shape the era of the Cold War, the new adjustments 
should ensure that NATO continues its importance in the global security spectrum. 
Therefore new tasks were added due to a new threat assessment of the alliance. The 
Soviet Union was not perceived as a threat, but rather than a risk: 
In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that 
accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact 
that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other 
European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of 
the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if 
stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.50 
By this new concept the NATO members acknowledged that a secure Europe was 
dependent on the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear and conventional forces. But besides the 
verification that Russia was transitioning from a country which threatened Europe to a 
country due to its capabilities is still a risk for Europe. Accordingly,  NATO with its 
Military Document 400 (MC 400) “ceased planning for operations against a clearly 
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defined adversary and has taken its primary purposes crisis management and promoting 
international stability, as seen its shift from threat assessment to risk assessment.”51 
Furthermore NATO created Rapid Reaction Forces and the Combined Joint Task Force 
Project, which were put forward at the January 1994 Brussels summit. This concept 
allowed NATO “to engage in military actions with other international entities…”52 such 
as the WEU.  The creation of Rapid Reaction Forces which are “…smaller, more mobile 
forces that stood at lower levels of readiness” makes it obvious that future conflicts had 
to be managed outside of the periphery of central Europe and therefore outside of 
NATO’s former area of interest. The “…future tasks of the Alliance would not end at the 
borders of Europe.”53 
By affirming this new concept the Germans had acknowledged that they still 
wished the security provided by the U.S., and that Germany would be willing to 
contribute and support military actions in regions other than Europe. This promise was 
proven with the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that began in 1991. The attempt of the 
European countries to solve the conflict with soft-power and civilian means failed 
catastrophically.54 Civilized means of the European Union were without any positive 
effects. Military means were necessary to conduct the embargo operation in the Adriatic 
Sea. This operation was a close cooperation between the WEU and NATO under a UN 
Resolution. Germany participated in the NATO Operation Sharp Guard to control 
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merchant shipping in order to prevent weapon deliveries to Yugoslavia.55 In the 
following operation Deny Flight, NATO for the first time in its history was engaged in 
combat which finally forced the Serbs to agree to a cease fire. The Dayton peace 
agreement of December 1995 was finally enforced by NATO under a UN mandate.  
Germany agreed to these operations but, due to the constitutional prohibition of using 
German troops, did not support these operations militarily. The western partners were 
less and less willing to accept this German behavior, and demanded that Germany share 
more equally in operations.  The use of the Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) to enforce the UN Resolution Deny Flight brought up the first discussion 
about German participation. The fact that these air crews were multinational---therefore 
dependent on German participation---raised questions in the German Parliament that 
divided the Kohl cabinet from the opposition parties. It was the opposition of the former 
conservative administration under Kohl which came  under fire. The social democrats 
and the green party did require a constitutional act of law to allow the German 
participation.  
With the constitutional decision in June 12, 1994 in favor of Article 24 and 
collective security,  Germany was allowed to participate in any multilateral engagements 
necessary for peace enforcement or peace building.56  With this decision the general 
basics of security policy changed. Germany, always willing to contribute and support by 
indirect means, from now on could not hide behind the constitutional paragraphs.  
Indirect help was provided even before this act of law by naval ships, maritime patrol 
aircraft, logistical operations through the Rhein-Main Airbase, and AWACS crews. No 
example of direct participation in the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) ever happened. 
But Germany supported the following Stabilization Force (SFOR) beginning December 
1995. From this date up to the end of the NATO SFOR Mission in December 2004 more 
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than 63.500 German soldiers had served in SFOR operations.57 The follow-on operation 
of SFOR, the EUFOR operation which began in December 2004 were deeply integrated 
into the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo. 
 Germany awarded priority to  NATO during the time of the Kohl administration 
as shown above. This fact can be further acknowledged by the change of the French 
position towards NATO during the mid 1990s. France linked its willingness for further 
NATO integration with the demand of an Europeanization of NATO. Therefore France 
demanded to receive “as much weight within the new command structure as the other 
large European member states…[Britain and Germany].” The U.S. already had “cut its 
share at the allied military headquarters, where only two of the top twelve generals were 
American, compared with five or six during the Cold War.” 58 
 France linked its reintegration to NATO on two conditions.  First, it demanded to 
receive the command post of the regional command south in Naples, and second, that 
they would subsequently support the U.S. intent for further NATO enlargement to the 
east.59  The U.S. relied on a U.S.-assigned command post due to the fact that the 6th Fleet 
of the U.S. Navy was subordinated to the U.S. admiral of the Naples command post. This 
fleet was responsible for the surveillance of the area not only close to Israel but also for 
the Suez Canal. From this strategic point Mediterranean shipping into the Persian Gulf 
can be controlled. Germany first supported Paris’s attempt but became aware of U.S. 
intentions to reject this French attempt. Therefore Germany made the recommendation 
for a temporary assignment where the command post would rotate between Europe and 
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then on took positions that would not cause any tensions with the U.S. leaders in their 
demand to keep this command posture. After this defeat, France used this U.S. decision 
to reject any further NATO integration.60 
B. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, one can see that Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) continued to 
balance politics between NATO and Europe. But wherever a choice had to be made, 
Germany favored the U.S.-led NATO security pillar. A Europeanization which loosened 
its ties towards NATO did not take place in the years after German reunification during 
the Kohl administration. Just the opposite, because it was Chancellor Kohl who made the 
decision to entangle the German armed forces in multilateral forces like the American-
German Brigade, the German-American Brigade, and the German-Netherlands Brigade. 
Furthermore Germany tried to entangle France into with NATO again, but this attempt 
was only partly successful, with the German-Franco Brigade which transitioned to the 
Eurocorps.  Finally France and Germany hammered out an agreement to make this force 
also available for NATO operations under NATO command.  A prioritization of NATO 
can be acknowledged in so far that Germany in a time of redefinition of its foreign 
security after reunification always intended to tie any European development to NATO. 
In times where a decision had to be made for one or the other, Germany favored NATO 
as we can see in France’s demand for the southern command post in Naples. However, 
some argue that the former German Chancellor Kohl was more an Europeanist, not 
forgetting that it was him who made the decision for further integration of Germany into 
NATO as well as supported the U.S. attempt for NATO enlargement when France 
rejected this idea. During the Kohl administration, therefore, we can see that continuity 
existed and was favored by the German government. However, after the reunification a 
political change occurred in 1998 which was underestimated by his administration.  For 
the first time in German history, a socialist-green administration took over and an 
element of new dynamism as well as uncertainty made itself felt in a European system 
that had lurched into enduring flux and change. 
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IV. THE SCHROEDER ADMINISTRATION AND NATO-EU 
DEVELOPMENT, 1998-2005 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Schroeder cabinet of a centre left coalition represented a significant phase of 
change and reorientation in German security and defense policy in the era since 1949. 
This chapter is divided into two subchapters: the first deals with Germany’s influence in 
the development of NATO, the second with the development of the European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP). After the German reunification in 1990 under the 
administration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl the cabinet change in 1998 was not only a 
political change, but also a generational change within the politics of German parties. For 
the first time in the history of Germany a coalition of social democrats and Greens had 
taken over the responsibility for Germany’s security. In addition to the fact that the Green 
party traditionally rejected any out-of-area missions as well as any integration into 
NATO, influences of a generational change could be attributed to the fact that for the first 
time politicians came to office without any experience of the Second World War as well 
as the experience of the late 1960s as concerns the consolidation and upheaval in the 
story of German democracy since 1945. This new generation demanded a “new self-
confident German foreign policy.”61  Such policy often meant, in practice, the radical 
questioning of the tenets of statecraft since 1949.  
With these facts in mind this chapter investigates how far the Schroeder 
administration evaluated and supported the development of the ESDP to become a more 
independent alternative option to NATO.  Did this administration continue the policy of 
integration and multilateralism of its predecessor Helmut Kohl? Thereafter, the following 
chapter investigates how far the development of NATO was supported by the red-green 
coalition.62 This discussion develops in tandem with the last chapter, which investigates 
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the German Armed Forces and its development after the Cold War. This enables us to 
understand that a re nationalization of German foreign security was not a viable option, 
and links Germany to one or both security pillars. Finally, the opinion of the German 
society towards its armed forces and the use of force that became regular during this 
decade is investigated in order to demonstrate that the chosen policy of more European 
autonomy is not only a political attempt of one party but finds  support across the 
spectrum of German society. This analysis yields two main ideas. First, that a gap is 
slowly appearing between the administrations’ use of the German armed forces and 
secondly, that the society is more and more identifying itself with a European rather than 
a transatlantic identity. 
B. GERMANY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO, 1998-2005 
During the years of the Kohl administration decisive steps were taken which 
ensured a close German link to NATO, and showed continuity rather than structural 
changes in the premises of the German armed forces. The first NATO meeting after the 
administration change took place in Washington in April 1999, where all NATO 
members ratified the new NATO Strategic Concept at the time of the Kosovo operation. 
This document announced the necessary changes which ensured that NATO would be 
able to meet the new strategic challenges of this time. Germany acknowledged the new 
“appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including 
oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”63 But besides the acknowledgment of new 
tasks the importance of the nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. was especially 
emphasized by the NATO members.64 This fact shows that the threat assessment of the 
member states changed from a static threat posed by nuclear forces of the Soviet Union to 
a new challenge of unconventional, even non-state actors which required the 
transformation of national forces of NATO’s member states. This change has to be linked 
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to experiences during the years of the Balkan conflict. Two major lessons were drawn by 
the NATO members: first, that Europe was incapable of handling this conflict on its own 
and second, that Europe had not made significant progress shifting from static land based 
forces of the Cold War towards high mobile fast deployable forces. Therefore the allies 
approved the Defense Capability Initiative at the Washington summit in April 1999. This 
initiative was designed to: 
…improve the defense capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the 
effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of 
Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment 
with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces 
(where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defense 
capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deploy-ability 
and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their 
survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and 
control and information systems.65 
This decision ensured a dual track development. Nuclear security would be 
provided mainly by the U.S., but conventional forces would be transformed into fast 
deployable and useful assets for peacekeeping missions. Lord Robertson stated that 
“Kosovo should not be seen as a model for the future. Ideally, the future should be 
characterized by more prevention and less intervention.”66 Therefore a more civilian 
aspect arrived in the arena of NATO. The identified lack of capabilities was finally 
addressed in the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) during the NATO Prague 
Summit in November 2002. More than 400 single issues got ratified and 42 issue related 
solution groups were tasked to resolve the development of capabilities which would close 
the gap between the different members of NATO. Germany participates in 19 groups and 
is the leader of 6 of these capability groups. Special emphasis is laid on the realm of 
strategic airlift, combat search and rescue, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision 
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guided weapons.67 Furthermore NATO decided to establish further rapid response forces. 
These NATO Response Forces (NRF) would provide 21,000 troops which should be 
deployable within five days and able to sustain up to thirty days without further 
support.68 Germany showed respectable engagement with 5,000 NATO certified troops 
or 25 % of the whole contingency of these NATO troops.69 This development should 
foster NATO’s capabilities in order to counter the threat of terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction which were emphasized as the main threat after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001. 
The decisions made during the NATO meeting in Prague were immediately 
implemented in the German National Guidelines for Defense Policy or 
Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien, and the conceptual design of the Bundeswehr or 
Konzeption der Bundeswehr. The red-green coalition states in the conceptual design of 
the Bundeswehr that “the transatlantic partnership remains the main pillar of German 
security policy, because a secure Europe without the U.S. is inconceivable. Furthermore 
this cooperation is historically grown, based on common cultural roots, and serves the 
common interests and values. Therefore the security strategies of Europe and the United 
States are intrinsically tied together.”70 
C. COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PILLAR - EUROPE’S 
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY, 1992-2005  
The development of the European Union was always linked to an attempt to build 
a common security policy. The first attempt was made by France in 1954 to build the 
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European Defense Community (EDC). This attempt had two main goals: first, to achieve 
a deeper integration of the European member states, especially Germany, into the 
European Union and second, to develop a security community which would lead to the 
development of a common economic and monetary union. After it failed to be ratified by 
the French National Parliament in 1954, NATO remained the main organization 
responsible for European Security.71 
 After the French attempt failed it took the collapse of the bipolar world  to change 
the global environment for the development of the Common Foreign Security Policy 
(CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. However the European Union had not 
developed a common security and defense policy nor had it developed a common 
command structure for military missions. 
 The European members finally became aware that a discrepancy existed between 
the European strength in economical and financial issues and security issues. In 1998 the 
United Kingdom (UK) feared that NATO might become unnecessary due to the changed 
global security environment and the lack of European capabilities. It feared that the U.S. 
might turn its back on NATO because Europe over the years after 1989/90 had not 
changed its capabilities from land-based military assets towards fast deployable troops. 
The U.S. had often demanded that the Europeans do so. The Balkan Wars had made it 
particularly obvious that the European forces were neither fast-deployable nor able to 
work sufficiently together with the more modern U.S. forces. 
Together with France, the UK started the development of the ESDP to “give 
Europe a stronger role in international affairs.”72 France, only a political member of 
NATO, followed its historic tradition to develop an ESDP which would lead to a more 
independent European security. This should enable the European states to gain a more 
European balance in NATO and “give themselves more options for dealing with future 
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crises, especially in cases in which the U.S. may be reluctant to become involved.”73 In 
sum, the French attempt was not focused on NATO; rather, to achieve the position where 
Europe could act autonomously when needed.74 Germany was not invited due to the 
mistrust of France and Britain towards the new German administration. Understandably, 
the British change in foreign policy towards the development of an institution where 
British forces would have to be assigned to commands besides NATO raised fears on the 
other side of the Atlantic. The U.S., as well as other European NATO members not 
members of the European Union, feared that with this British-French attempt an 
institution might evolve which might become a rival towards NATO, and eventually 
diminish NATO as an effective security organization within Europe. 
Soon after the St. Malo meeting, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
in December 1998 declared that the U.S. would only accept the development of a 
European Security and Defense Policy if it “…is consistent with the basic principles that 
served the Atlantic partnership well for 50 years.”75 A development from the U.S. 
perspective was only acceptable if it would consider that no duplication, no 
discrimination, and no decoupling would be ensured. With these three D’s the U.S. 
wanted to ensure that no duplication of NATO’s assets or capabilities would be built, that 
no European NATO member not member of the European Union would be discriminated 
against, and that the European Union would not foster developments which would allow 
the European Union decision making process to be unhooked from NATO, by which the 
EU would become independent of NATO. Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of 
NATO, only one year later tried to ease the tensions between the U.S. and the EU by 
proposing that a European Security and Defense Policy should develop under the 
conditions of three I’s: 
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• That any EU development should improve the European defense 
capabilities; 
• Provide inclusiveness and transparency for all allies; and 
• Ensure the indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on shared values. 
By these points Robertson wanted to ensure that a European security development would 
not mean “…less U.S....[but] more Europe…and a stronger NATO.”76 
 In 1999 in Helsinki under the German Ratspraesidentschaft or German Council 
Presidency and the experience of the NATO air campaign in Kosovo the EU announced 
its intent to “develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a 
whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to 
international crises.”77 Germany therefore took the bilateral issue of France and Britain 
and made it an issue of the whole European Union. The attempt for autonomy became an 
issue for the first time in the strategy of its security. Thereafter the EU decided, at the 
Helsinki summit in 1999, to establish a stringent institutional decision-making framework 
for ESDP and to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 60,000 soldiers, 
deployable within 60 days, and sustainable up to one year. This force would become 
operational in 2003, with the capability to undertake the Petersberg-Tasks. This 
contingent would not be a standing force, but the several nations would designate 
national forces which would then be assimilated in the European Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF).78 The primary goals ratified during the Helsinki meeting were implemented in 
the Amsterdam Treaty, where the Petersberg Tasks were integrated in the Common 
Foreign Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP). The EU member states 
committed themselves to increase their military capabilities, enhance their technological 
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abilities, and to harmonize their defense planning. In this strategic policy Germany 
became the engine of the European development and was willing to follow this track, 
which meant that own military capabilities could be assigned to EU missions. Besides 
this development Germany supported the establishing of a broader approach to security 
than NATO alone. With the decision made by the European Union in Feira in June 2000, 
the EU moved to develop the potential of police, judicial, civil, and disaster relief 
personnel, in addition to enhanced military capabilities, in order to prepare for future 
experiences similar to the Balkan conflict.79 With this major decision the ESDP not only 
technically enlarges its operational capabilities for a much wider array of missions than 
NATO, but also ensures that it is able to contribute civilian personnel for crisis 
prevention, crisis management and post crisis missions. The numbers of personnel 
available for such missions were finally set during the Civilian Capabilities Commitment 
Conference in 2004, whereby 5761 police forces, 631 judicial personnel, 562 
administrative personnel, and 4988 experts for disaster relief operations were agreed by 
its members.80 
 In the EU Conference in Nice, in December 2000, the European members decided 
to establish a command structure to plan for ERRF missions. During this meeting the 
member states made the decision to integrate the former WEU tasks into the EU, and 
decided to establish a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) where the ambassadors of the 
member states define the political and strategic goals, a European Military Committee 
(EUMC) which supports the PCG, and a European Military Staff (EUMS) which is 
responsible for the operational planning process.81 This affirms that Germany was 
willing to integrate military issues into the political decision process in Brussels, and that 
the EU established its own NATO-independent command structures for EU operations. 
This command cell is similar to NATO’s, and provides the necessary infrastructure for 
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ESDP.82 Germany never developed its own military general staff because its armed 
forces were always assigned under NATO command, avoiding development toward 
armed forces which might become a state within the state. However, the development of 
a NATO-autonomous European command structure is in fact the development of a 
general staff responsible for EU missions, with German participation. 
 The global environment changed with the experience of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, and made asymmetrical threats an 
issue which had to be taken into account in much the manner that nuclear weapons had 
been the center of gravity for half a century. Where the first Headline Goal of 1999 was 
mainly driven by the experiences of the Kosovo war, the  current Headline Goal should 
tackle the shortfall of “highly mobile specialized forces”. Acknowledged by the EU 
defense ministers in 2004, 13 Battle Groups would be established by 2007 with 1500 men 
each, deployable within 15 days and ready to conduct high intensive operations, 
sustainable up to 30 days and in a rotational term up to 120 days.83 
 The missions for which these forces are established can be affirmed by the 
Petersberg Tasks and the first European Security Strategy ratified in December 200384. 
The Petersberg Tasks consist of four possible scenarios: humanitarian assistance, search 
and rescue, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The European Security Strategy (ESS) 
affirms five threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
regional conflicts, states’ failure, and organized crime.  Germany as a member of the EU 
acknowledges these threats in language similar to NATO, that “the most frightening 
scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.”85 Hereby 
one can see that the threat assessment is common to both organizations, and that  
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Germany technically supported the development of a stand-alone European command 
structure for EU’s autonomous operations by the development of independent forces and 
command structures. 
D. COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND EU 
 All NATO states welcomed the purpose of the ESDP in December 2002, 
including military operations, but within the boundaries that EU military operations 
should only be conducted in areas where “NATO as a whole is not engaged.”86 To avoid 
any parting of the ways between NATO and the EU, and to foster the development of 
both NATO and EU, the “Berlin-Plus” package, agreed to by both organizations in 
Washington in April 1999 and finally ratified in March 2003,87 enabled the EU to borrow 
Alliance assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. This option not only increased 
EU’s capabilities for specific operations but furthermore avoided the duplication of assets 
which are available in NATO but not within the EU.88 In addition, this agreement 
ensured NATO the right to grant use as well as to refuse these assets if deemed 
necessary. The fact that the use of NATO assets is dependent on the consensus decision 
of NATO heavily influenced by the U.S., and that NATO can refuse these assets makes 
this agreement fragile, and fosters especially the French attempt to develop independent 
capabilities.89 France did in fact demand assured access to NATO capabilities, which 
were refused by the U.S. Furthermore, France believed that the consultation mechanism 
of the “Berlin–plus” agreement could  be abused by the U.S. to influence EU operations. 
Besides this, France feared that NATO’s demands for right of first refusal might 
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constrain the liberty of EU decision making because it would cause EU dependence on 
NATO. Therefore a duplication of its own assets seemed to be unavoidable in some areas 
because NATO would only provide planning and command structures, as well as 
capabilities if they did not need these capabilities for themselves. Furthermore questions 
are unanswered if the EU is always willingly to accept that one veto of any NATO 
member could refuse any capabilities, furthermore the question if the EU, especially 
France is willing to accept the D-SACEUR (always a British or German Flag-officer) of 
an EU operation with NATO assets is still unanswered. Especially France might not be 
willing to accept that EU operations are always under Operation Command (OPCOM) of 
a German or British Flag officer. 
As stated, NATO decisions to donate assets will be made on a case by case basis, 
and time will tell if the EU will always be willing to accept these provisions. The 
decision made by France and Germany to conduct an EU-led operation under UN 
resolution in Congo in 2003 and 2006 without assets of NATO and without previous 
consultation with NATO and especially the U.S., again caused tensions in the 
relationship between NATO and the EU. This attempt to operate without NATO assets is 
the second path which the EU can embark on when autonomous operations are preferred. 
These examples demonstrate that the demand of NATO for the right of first refusal has 
not limited independent action by the EU. With this development Germany not only had 
supported a position that placed the EU and NATO as rivals, but also could become 
involved in three problematic scenarios which may lead to further tensions between both 
organizations: first, the reaction of NATO if an EU-led operation with NATO assets 
where NATO assets get lost, or if the primary operation of the EU becomes more violent 
than anticipated, where further NATO support is necessary for success, but not 
guaranteed because of the veto. Second, a similar situation might arise if NATO assets 
support an EU-led operation but then need those same assets for its own operational 
purposes for a new conflict. This is yet a theoretical case which might become reality 
some day. Third, no agreement has yet been made about the share of labor in operational 
areas where both NATO as well as EU are operating in the same area at the same time. 
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These potentially critical situations cause insecurity about the reliability between 
both organizations, and distrust still exists not only on both sides the Atlantic but also 
within the European Union. Differences can be seen as well in the fact that France prefers 
EU operations without the Berlin-plus agreement where for Germany “…the use of 
NATO assets remains first choice.”90 Only long-term developments will show how far 
the German attempt to link the European options with the transatlantic options will 
finally be able to bind France closer to NATO.91 Unfortunately the Schroeder 
administration has moved closer to France’s demand for more autonomy, and also tried to 
saturate NATO integration without taking into account the unresolved rivalry between 
both organizations. 
 There seems to be a division of labor between what the EU is willing and actually 
able to do and what NATO is better equipped for. The undeniable fact that the EU and 
especially Germany does not have the capabilities and is still not willing to increase its 
defense budgets shows clearly that they do rely on soft rather than hard power. The 
operational area of the EU is concentrated on the periphery of the EU and focuses less on 
military issues. 
 The gap of European assets especially in the realm of Command, Control, 
Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is 
still unsolved. The EU made attempts to minimize the capability gap but Europe is still 
unable to conduct global operations, and the development of the ESDP is still dependent 
on NATO in highly intensive operations. The pooling of military capabilities is congruent 
to the capabilities which are demanded in the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) of 
NATO. 
 Furthermore the EU operations of the past very much affirm this concept of 
shared labor. Some operations such as Concordia were done under the Berlin-plus 
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agreement where the EU used the command and planning capabilities of NATO, the D-
SACEUR was the operational commander, and the European Force Commander was 
supported by the Senior Military Representative of NATO. Similar arrangements were 
established during the operation Althea. In sum, the EU is taking over operations when 
NATO has accomplished the more robust task and when less demanding military 
requirements are necessary; it is operating independently of NATO in less intensive 
operations at the lower end of the Petersberg Tasks. 
 However, the EU-led operations without support by NATO show a less 
significant amount of cooperation. The EU did not consult NATO concerning the Congo 
operation in spring 2006. This shows a lesser degree of transparency and consultation 
than operations under Berlin-plus arrangements. The German-French agreement to 
develop an independent EU airlift command, a satellite intelligence community, and a 
common European Defense market during the EU meeting in Mainz in June 2000 shows 
that some EU countries are pushing the development further ahead. All these points were 
later integrated in the summit meeting or  so called Pralinengipfel  (bon-bon summit) of 
Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium in 2003. 
Without question, the development of the ESDP was not only a surprising result 
of the British change in foreign security policy but also a development that took place 
with uncommon speed in the short timeframe since 1998 . However ESDP as an integral 
part of the European Union is still in a developing process. So far “the EU’s gradual 
accumulation of confidence and expertise in a new and largely unfamiliar area of policy 
will steadily enhance its credibility as a potential military actor.”92 That the development 
of ESDP European politics is becoming an engine which is running on its own steam can 
be observed, although some EU countries did push the development more forward than 
others. A prime example is when France, Germany, Luxemburg, and Belgium met in 
April 2003 to discuss the further development of security and defense issues of the 
European Union, and some feared that this might be an anti-American attempt for a more 
independent ESDP. 
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This fear was well founded. These same four countries that rejected the US-led 
war in Iraq and for weeks blocked NATO planning for the protection of Turkey, had now 
decided to accelerate the EU’s security development. However these countries finally 
agreed to establish a “nucleus” which enables the European Union to command their 
operations independently from NATO. This is especially interesting due to the fact that a 
few months before, in December 2002, an agreement was reached which ensured the EU 
the use of NATO planning and command structures.93 This could be seen as a general 
headquarters of the European Union, and could also be seen as a duplication of NATO 
capabilities. However, this nucleus is not comparable to the command structure of NATO 
in its capabilities, but it is similar in its structure.94 Furthermore these four states decided 
to develop an EU airlift command which would support NATO as well as EU 
operations.95 However its own independent command structure as well as its own 
strategic airlift capabilities would not be necessary if the EU would be willing in every 
circumstance to operate under the Berlin-plus agreement and integrate NATO. But the 
EU shows by this move that these nations want to strengthen the option to operate 
without NATO interference. The development of an EU cell which is integrated within 
the command structure of NATO in SHAPE only provides an opportunity for the EU to 
enhance the preparation of missions under the Berlin-plus agreement, but the EU prefers 
that autonomous military EU operations are mainly led by national or multinational 
headquarters.96 
This attempt for more autonomy can also be observed in the development of the 
European Constitution. It provides for European Union members commit forces in case 
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of an attack on the territory of one EU member state, and to take all available military and 
other capabilities to support the attacked member.97 This technically reduces NATO as 
the main organization for security and defense, if the EU were to have similar military 
capabilities at its disposal. 
 If one investigates what all EU operations in which Germany participated to date 
have in common is the threat assessment and the area of operation (AOO). The EU takes 
over operations from NATO when NATO has fulfilled the more military concentrated 
tasks, or the EU gets enrolled in missions which do not require high intensity use of 
force. Furthermore all EU missions are UN mandated missions, and at the European 
periphery. Still, the conceptual development of EU military capabilities is far ahead of 
the actual available capabilities of the EU. The EU dependence on NATO is still 
substantial. Therefore, the next chapter investigates the main capability gaps of the 
German armed forces, and the last chapter investigates how far the German society 
supports the entanglement of German armed forces in out-of-area missions, and if 
developments demonstrate that German society more and more identifies itself with the 
European Union, which would foster the political development for more autonomy. 
 In sum, one can posit that development of the ESDP was a rapid process where 
Germany and France made significant adjustments to its security policy. Germany moved 
closer to the French demand for more autonomy. Especially with the development of an 
independent NATO command structure, its own military airlift command, the 
development of its own defense research and development institute, and also with a much 
broader approach towards security with the development of police-forces, judicial 
capabilities, as well as administrative personnel and experts for disaster relief operations, 
Germany fostered the development of an institution which rivals NATO not only in 
existing circumstances but also in future security issues. The EU developed a two way 
path, one in which it is able to operate with and within the structure of NATO and its 
assets, and the second where it is able to operate totally independent of NATO. EU-only 
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operations usually take place in less hostile environments, but the development of 
European Rapid Reaction Corps enables the EU even to operate with fast deployable 
troops in high intensity conflict environments. Berlin does not see any endangerment of 
NATO in the way both organizations have developed during this timeframe. Both 
organizations still exist, each with evolving missions, and two questions remain to be 
answered: first, the extent to which the capabilities of the German armed forces require a 
strong link to the better equipped, U.S.-led NATO organization, and second, if German 
society has developed a  a more European identity in which the Bundeswehr would 
participate regionally. If so, the disputes between the U.S. and Germany concerning the 
Iraq War may be the beginning of a “parting of the ways” concerning their understanding 
of legitimate pre-emptive strikes but also could be seen as the beginning of different  
understandings concerning the use of force within the respective political and strategic 
cultures of the two nations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The administration change which took place in 1998 from the conservative and 
transatlantic oriented Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the socialist and Europeanist Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder was a decisive moment in the security policy of Germany. This 
change of politics may also be explained as a generational change. However the policy of 
integration does not show any relevant change towards NATO rather than continuity by 
its support of the strategically change of NATO’s security policy. Besides evolving 
support of NATO we can also see that a rapid development of more and more 
autonomous European Security and Defense policy took place during these years. 
Ironically these changes were enabled by the British change of foreign security policy 
after the experiences of the Balkan Wars. The British feared that the European military 
capabilities were too weak, and that this weakness might lead to the diminishing of 
NATO from a U.S. perspective, and triggered the British attempt to accelerate European 
capabilities in order to ensure NATO’s survival. However this attempt was guided by 
France and Germany into a slightly different direction. The meeting of the four 
continental European states--Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Germany--in April 2004 
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enabled the development of more autonomous European security. Germany for the first 
time in its history moved closer to the French idea of European security, but not without 
wholly discrediting NATO. However this development shows a change which raises two 
issues. The first is the extent to which the German armed forces’ security needs 
determined its motivation for a more autonomous European security on a quasi Gaullist 
model. The second is the extent to which the change of German foreign policy is not only 
a political change of one party, but finds its support in a society which more and more 
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V. GERMAN ARMED FORCES AND THE GERMAN SOCIETY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The  basic assumption of many European states after the Cold War has been that 
future conflicts would be rare and mainly solved by non-military means. This ideal was 
heavily damaged by the experiences of the Balkan Wars.  However, after 1990 the 
western states cut their defense expenditures, redirecting funds toward a peace dividend 
in order to enhance their welfare states. “Between 1990 and 1994, U.S. defense spending, 
measured in constant prices, declined at an average rate of 5.3 percent per year. Only 
NATO members Belgium and Germany cut defense spending at a faster rate during this 
period.”98 The Balkan Wars finally showed that the interoperability of the European 
forces was not the only problem but the major point of European weaknesses. As the 
German armed forces participated during the air campaign Allied Force with 14 Tornados 
as Multi role Combat Aircrafts (MRCA) between March 1999 and June 1999 not only 
showed an obvious quantitative gap but also a qualitative gap with US flying forces. The 
lack of precision guided bombs, real time data-links, and information concerning friend 
of foe exchange are only a few of the capabilities where interoperability was not on an 
equal footing.99 The experiences showed that a lack of capabilities constrained the 
autonomy not only of German but of European operations. 
However, this chapter does not investigate quantitative differences between 
Germany’s armed forces and the rest of the transatlantic alliance. The European Union is 
able to master autonomous operations by itself with the developments made with ESDP; 
therefore, the efficiency of this growing institution will be assumed here for the purposes 
of this study. But this chapter investigates what major capabilities Germany as a part of 
the European Union is lacking, and to what extent the defense budget constrains its 
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military capabilities. This analysis demonstrates that Germany and the EU remain 
dependent on NATO for crises of higher intensity. The next step is to compare the 
security developments of  NATO and EU, and how these developments either supported 
close cooperation or contributed towards more autonomous European capabilities. 
 The second part of this chapter then investigates the parallel movement of German 
politics and society toward a more European identity over the recent decades. By 
investigating this issue it becomes clear that the rejection of the Iraq War was not only an 
issue of Chancellor Schroeder and President George W. Bush not liking each other. 
Furthermore, the Schroeder attempt to make these differences public to win his election is 
surely another statement for example made by the US scholar Stephen S. Szabo. 
Evidence is found that traces the development of a more European identification within 
German society, which in the long term will increase the tensions between the European 
and the transatlantic security organizations. With the investigation of German political 
opinion, we find evidence that the development of more autonomous European 
capabilities is not only a development based on Social Democratic party, but also finds its 
support in a growing European identity within German society. 
B. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES 
During recent years defense expenditures worldwide increased significantly, 
especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on the morning of 
September 11, 2001. The strategic changes made afterwards affected all members of 
NATO. The necessity for a transformation of the German armed forces were first 
acknowledged in May 2003 with the defense political guidelines or 
Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien of the former German Minister of Defense Dr. Peter 
Struck. Only one year later this led to a revamped concept of the German armed forces in 
August 2004. This paper prioritizes the same threats as the NATO Strategic Concept. 
International terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the comparison of both are the 
highest threats at present.100 The process of transformation should be an endurable, 
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foresighted process which should enhance the capabilities of the Bundeswehr. It should 
confront the rationales, concepts, training, organization, and equipment of the armed 
forces, and finally establish something totally new.101 
Surely the global change of security made it necessary to adopt and rapidly 
change the capabilities of armed forces. Since 1989, 26 states have collapsed, new threats 
appeared and Germany with its 5,800 armoured tanks, 650 airplanes, and 36 brigades 
were fitted for an essential support of its NATO allies to fight any Warsaw attack on 
German soil.102 But this time was gone. The new challenges demand new capabilities 
able to project power into locales of conflict and crisis far away from Europe. The main 
deficiencies can be seen in the realms of strategic airlift capacities, intelligence, precision 
guided ammunition, and command and control abilities.  
The security environment made a change necessary, and it was acknowledged by 
the red-green coalition with the defense policy guidelines. Since then, however, the 
general transformation set out in the guidelines lacks the financial base in order to 
achieve enhanced capabilities. Only minor changes have taken place during recent years. 
This of course is not only a typically German but a European problem.  Although the 
German defense expenditure surely is  not appropriately comparable to the expenditure 
paid by the US,  German spending levels as one of the European major powers should be 
comparable to those of Britain and France. Germany’s defense budget since 2001 has 
steadily decreased, and shows a contrary development to the other major European states. 
France spent 46.2 billion USD during 2005, where Britain spent 48.3 billion USD in the 
same year. Germany, for many years ranking among the first five in worldwide military 
spending, appropriated 33.2 billion USD, ranking  6th behind Japan, and China and is 
likely to be overcome in the next years by Russia.103 But besides the countable numbers, 
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money is not only available in an unsatisfactory amount but it is also spent for 
questionable issues. Due to the lack of strategic airlift capabilities Germany spent 53.5 
million USD during 2003 for the transportation of 16,400 tons of material from Germany 
to Afghanistan. From the beginning of January in 2002 until December 2002 178 flights 
by Antonow Type An-124, and 191 flights with Ilyushin Typ Il-76 were chartered.104 
The actual Transall C-130 is not able to meet the required capabilities and the preferred 
Airbus A400-M will not be in service until 2010. Besides these costs Germany will have 
to pay 8.3 billion Euros for 180 Eurofighters. The cost of one Eurofighter is actually 
108.3 million Euros, which could be used to buy 259 armored troop vehicles like the 
Dingo, a key piece of equipment most needed in all out-of-area missions. The actual 
capabilities are described in the 2007 Wehrplan or defense plan  by Chief of Staff 
General Schneiderhahn as “…a modernization [that] is not achievable in the assigned 
timeframe…and that financial defense investments could only be made in a restricted 
volume.”105 With a defense expenditure of 1.5% of Germany’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2001, Germany is investing much less than France with 2.6% and Britain with 
2.5%. On a different level, Germany invested only 23.2% of its defense expenditure for 
investment in new assets, whereby France invested 35.4% and Britain even 38.6% of its 
defense expenditure for future systems.106 The actual costs for out-of-area missions did 
rise in an unexpected dimension. While 377 million Euros were planned to be spent for 
the Afghanistan contingency, 500 million were paid during 2005, and while only 418 
million were calculated for the year 2006, the operating costs were 13% above the 
estimated costs and 472, million Euros were finally spent.107 A re-nationalization of 
Germany’s foreign security policy can be negated by these facts. It is not a purely 
national solution; rather, a common solution which therefore has to be investigated. Due 
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to its lack of capabilities, as Mary Elise Sarotte of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London puts it, “Germany’s credibility and image as a good EU and NATO 
partner is now in question in an unprecedented way.”108 
As explained by its lack of military and financial assets, Germany did not have 
the opportunity to choose a unilateral course. This fact forces Germany to acknowledge 
that NATO’s and the EU’s defense capability developments have to be compatible. The 
lack of financial resources would otherwise overwhelm its budget as well as its 
capabilities. But this in some sense is contrary to the development a more autonomous 
EU capability as supported by the Pralinengipfel (chocolate summit) of France, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and Germany in April 2003 in Brussels. Did Germany with its 
Ruestungspolitik or Defense politics intend that it was not only willing to transform its 
armed forces but also enhance its capabilities to be a more reliable partner in NATO, the 
EU or in both? 
With the ratification of the European Capability Action Plan in November 2001 
the European Union wanted to enhance “…effectiveness and efficiency of European 
military capability efforts.” This should be done in “coordination between EU member 
states and cooperation with NATO [in order to] avoid wasteful duplication and ensure 
transparency and consistency with NATO.”109 With this voluntary approach of the EU 
members nineteen panels were established in order to enhance the European capabilities. 
Germany participates in 12 of these panels, and is the leading nation in the realm of 
combat search and rescue and tactical unmanned air vehicles for surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets. With the decision of Germany to take a leading role in the ERRF 
with 18,000 soldiers, Germany shows a deep European integration in the European 
defense development as well. However, NATO followed a more focused track with its 
decision during the Prague summit in 2002. The Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) 
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the members of NATO agreed to transform their capabilities for combat operations 
outside Europe. Special capabilities such as strategic airlift, aerial refuelling, and fast 
deployable troops had to be established. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is an 
example of the new challenge NATO wanted to meet.110 Besides the development of the 
NRF, NATO decided to concentrate on three key aspects of activity in order to meet the 
new challenges of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 
three major key capabilities were: aerial refuelling under Spanish leadership, precision 
guided weapons under Dutch leadership, and strategic air transport under German 
leadership.111 It should be noted that the enhancement of capabilities in NATO are efforts 
which have to be undertaken by the European members, who at the same time are 
members of the EU. Both organizations, NATO as the EU, concentrate on enhancing 
similar capabilities in the military realm. Due to the fact that only European states have to 
enhance their abilities this will require a close consultation and collaboration of the 
European states; the similar capabilities which have to be developed for the EU as well as 
for NATO the developments ensure interoperability. 
The threat assessment of Germany acknowledges the same threats as the EU and 
NATO does. However, in choosing the means to solve these problems Germany is more 
in favor of the European approach to use not only military assets. Germany states in its 
White Paper from 2006 that “Risks and threats have to be countered with diplomatic, 
economic, foreign aid, and if necessary with the use of force.”112 Hereby one can see that 
both organizations have developed comparably in threat assessment and the necessary 
assets which have to be developed by the European members. However one can also see 
that both organizations developed differently. NATO concentrates with its NATO 
Response Force on the capability for high-end conflict, where with the European Union’s 
decision to enhance its military capabilities as well as to develop more effective civil 
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military capabilities, as described in chapter III, concentrates on both high- and low- end 
conflicts. Therefore the European Union, and especially Germany, is still dependent on 
NATO due to its lack of capabilities. Technically the necessary structure is developed 
and was supported by Germany during the Schroeder administration. With this 
development a rivalry does exists between both institutions and time will tell if the 
different assumptions about the means to be used for conflict resolution might endanger 
NATO’s existence. Interestingly, the development of the EU can be seen as rapid and 
strong willed. Therefore the question has to be addressed about how the NATO and EU 
developments find support in German society. 
C. THE GERMAN SOCIETY, GERMAN DEFENSE AND THE EU 
Since the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War, tremendous changes and new 
challenges have shaped the security environment of the world. Globalization has become 
a major issue, and security of alliances can not be ensured only by military terms. Threats 
as acknowledged by the NATO Strategic Concept and the European Strategic Concept 
are similar. Both agree that new threats are different than those of the Cold War era and 
more diffuse than ever before. However, this would foster the idea that those threats can 
not only be confronted by military means. But as we have seen above only the EU 
developed a broad strategy to bring all necessary players to the field. Thus different 
opinions about the use of force still split the transatlantic as well as European relations 
during these last seventeen years. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder rejected any U.S. Iraq 
invasion long prior to the invasion of U.S. forces in March 2003. Even under a UN 
resolution the German administration was not willing to support this military effort. 
Besides this rejection we can see that a European security and defense policy developed 
not only in a short period of time, but also with a broad approach of diplomatic, 
economic, foreign aid, and if necessary military means. The European Union by some 
scholars is therefore to be seen as the only and unique security management institution 
actually existing. Still, due to the lack of capabilities and unwillingness to increase its 
defense expenditure Germany is dependent on NATO and especially on U.S. capabilities. 
However, we have to consider that Chancellor Schroeder won his 2003 election partly 
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because of his position to reject any Iraq invasion. Therefore we should investigate if this 
is not only true in the case of the Iraq War, but is a result of more widespread pacifist 
behavior now preferred by German society for general security issues. If so, one can 
assume that the development of a more civilian power defense strategy such as the EU 
provides is more favored by German society. This would line up more closely with EU 
strategy and should cause further adjustment of NATO policies towards more civil-
military capabilities. Since security issues are also linked with energy and environmental 
issues these days, politics and policies of nations as well of alliances are steered even 
more by domestic interests and concerns. “All politics is local” was stated by Thomas 
O’Neill as a member of the U.S. Congress in the year 2000.113 Therefore one could 
suggest that the rejection of the Iraq War and its lack of support in German society was 
not only a concern about war and peace but also a concern of different beliefs about the 
means and ends of security policy. This would make a further European development 
more probable if NATO in the long term is not willing to broaden its approach towards 
the realm of civil-military capabilities and by doing so to increase the European weight 
within NATO. 
A re nationalization of Germany’s security policy can not be observed during the 
last decades. Therefore a national solution towards the new security challenges is 
unworkable. The developments described in the last chapter show that Germany 
supported movement toward more autonomous European capabilities. If evidence exists 
that supports this approach, it will make clear that any further political development will 
have to take this opinion into account. 
The transformation of the western security alliances, NATO as well as the EU, 
shows that conventional wars between states are becoming rarer than ever before. 
Interstate wars, ethnic conflicts, and religious conflict are the issues western societies 
have to deal with. Problems of defining combatants and non-combatants, ethnic cleansing 
like during the Balkan Wars, as well as access to conventional energy produce new 
                                                 
113 Sabine Collmer et al., “All politics is local: Deutsche Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im 
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dimensions in the security environment of today. Prosperity of the western states, and 
especially for Germany as one of the biggest export nations of the western world, is 
closely linked to these issues. The broad approach of the European Union, to prefer 
civilian means to solve these conflicts sets those nations, and especially Germany, apart 
from the U.S. tradition of a more hard power related security concept. 
The above mentioned conflicts triggered the western alliances to develop more 
modern, fast deployable forces in order to meet these new challenges. Germany 
participated in many attempts to solve crises and to support peace building during the last 
decades. The former constitutional base to establish forces for territorial defense became 
less and less important in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Interestingly, the most threatening issues facing European nations in 1993 were: 
1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 2) unemployment, 3) instability in 
Russia, 4) economic dominance of Japan and the U.S. This perception has shifted during 
recent years, and international terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass 
destruction became more dangerous threats than conventional or traditional wars.114 
German citizens, however, prioritize social issues even higher. Fair wages (76 %), social 
security (73 %), and  secure employment (68 %) are valued more important than 
militaerische Sicherheit or security and defense issues (66 %).115 However, the political 
elites decided to use the German armed forces more and more outside the regional 
territory in order to support multinational security organizations in solving conflicts in 
Africa, Central Eastern Europe, and the Far East. With this paradigmatic change a 
societal change can also be observed. According to an investigation of the Allensbach 
Institute more than 52 % of German society supports the use of the Bundeswehr to 
stabilize peace and believes that Germany has to share the burden in the international 
community. But beside these facts people also wish for a more independent European 
                                                 
114 European Commision, “Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 58,“ 
Umfragezeitraum Oct.-Nov. 2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007) 
115 Sozialwissenshaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, “Fruehjahrsgutachten. Repraesentativbefragung 
zu den Einstellungen und Meinungen in der Bevoelkerung zur Sicherheitspolitik,“ Straussberg, December 
2001. 
 56
defense industry. Especially feared is dependence on the U.S. in this issue.116 With the 
reduction of the German armed forces the question of Wehrgerechtigkeit or the 
equitableness of the conscript forces is becoming more and more an issue among youth. 
Only 37 % of the youth wants to serve as a conscript, where 50 % are in favour of 
professional forces.117 The German armed forces apparently enjoy a widespread 
reputation. However, many Germans share the attitude that they have no indebtedness to 
serve because they pay taxes. Therefore, while German citizens value the effort of the 
Bundeswehr in foreign regions, they do not want to participate in this effort personally. 
The numbers of refusals since 1990 have steadily increased. In 1999 as much as 42.2 % 
refused to serve as conscripts in the German armed forces. This decline, based on an 
investigation of the Ministry of Defense will further increase. The number of conscripts 
also decreased during the last decades due to the reduction of the German armed forces. 
In 1989, 218,194 Germans served as conscripts; in 2006, only 61,700 were drafted.118 
Just as  an observable generational change has taken place in the realm of politicians, 
who are now the leaders of the Federal Republic, one can also see that a generational 
change in the youth has taken place. An ethical change has changed the perception of 
duty and commitment. Idealistic selfishness, spontaneity, self-actualization, and leisure 
are more important than ever before. Florian Illies stated that this generation “…pays 
more attention how politicians are dressed rather than what they say or do…and that the 
members of this generation show a lack of emotions towards national as well as 
international policy.”119 Generally the society trusts the institution Bundeswehr but also 
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has a little interest in security issues. However, taking the different missions of the 
Petersberg Tasks of 1992 into account, a different picture can be drawn. More than 63 % 
percent of Germans support the participation in humanitarian and peace enforcing 
missions. Nearly 58 % support participation in a European force. A significant change 
can also be seen regarding participation in NATO conflict and peace building missions. 
Only 40 % support a participation of the Bundeswehr in these types of operations with 
this institution.120 A division can be acknowledged where the lower-end Petersberg Tasks 
are supported, as opposed to the use of force, mainly a task for NATO, is rejected. As 
Germans asked in one poll if, under specific circumstances, the use of force might be 
used to achieve justice, 62 % rejected this idea; even more, 68%, answered that conflicts 
independent of internal state or state against state conflicts could be solved by peaceful 
means. One can see that the German society not only rejects power politics supported by 
military means, but also thinks that this type of policy is less effective. Interestingly, 61 
% believe that only military strength ensures a stable and continued peace.121 The 
experiences of the Second World War still seem to be deeply rooted in the German mind; 
even so, a generational change has taken place. However they do believe that only 
military strength makes peace stable. With the developments since 1998, the European 
Union technically possesses the structure to act more autonomously from NATO. The 
accomplished missions of the European Union with German participation--Democratic 
Republic Congo in 2003 and 2006, the operation Concordia which was the follow-on 
operation to relieve NATO in Macedonia 2003--were all perceived as successful.  
 Investigating the  public opinion polling “Eurobarometers” of recent years, one can 
see that German society favors a European security and defense Policy, and support is 
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Table 1.   Agreement for a European Security and Defense Policy between 2001 and 
2006. German agreement (GER) and the overall European member states 
agreement (EU). 
 

































GER 78% 79% 79% 81% 76% 84% 80% 78% - 86% 84% 
EU 73% 71% 73% 74% 70% 77% 78% 75% -122 75% 75% 
Eurobarometer (EB) from 2001 to 2006123 
 
With 78 % in 2001, 79 % in 2002, 81 % in 2003, and 84 % in the latest investigation in 
2006 Germans favor an ESDP. In comparison, 42 % of all European states favor a 
European approach, but only 20 % favor delegating security issues to NATO. 
Interestingly, Denmark is the only European country which would favor delegating its 
security issues to NATO. Therefore the contrary visions concerning the Iraq War, 
Guantanamo, the U.S. willingness to consider pre-emptive engagements, the Kyoto-
Protocol, and the rejection of the International Judicial Court or Internationaler 
Strafgerichtshof divides not only Germans but Europeans from the U.S. more widely than 
ever before. In European eyes, this has caused a decline in U.S. legitimacy to be a role 
model of democratic behavior.124 In the timeframe Spring 2004, Autumn 2004, and 
Spring 2005 the Europeans were asked if they believe that the EU should develop a 
ESDP which is solely independent from any U.S. influence. Here an even higher degree 
of agreement can be found than for the agreement for the development of ESDP in 
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general. In the same timeframe Germans were asked which institution they personally 
would prefer as the institution to decide about European security issues. Three options 
were given: NATO, EU, or National. 
Concerning these results we can see that NATO is the institution which is favored 
least. Even a national option is more favored. The most preferred institution to make 
decisions about European security for the Germans during the timeframe autumn 2003 to 
autumn 2004 was the EU.  
 
Table 2.   Germans asked if the EU should develop a European Defense and Security 
Policy which is independent of the U.S.  German agreement (GER) 
 
 EB 61 Spring 2004 EB 62 Autumn 2004 EB 63 Spring 2005 
GER 84% 90% 87% 
Eurobarometer (EB): Spring 2004, Autumn 2004, Spring 2005. 
 
Table 3.   Germans asked which of the three institutions should decide about European 
security   German agreement (GER) towards NATO, EU, and NATIONAL 
 
 EB 61 Spring 2004 EB 62 Autumn 2004 EB 63 Spring 2005 
NATO 15% 15% 17% 
EU 44% 44% 57% 
NATIONAL 25% 25% 20% 
Eurobarometer (EB): Autumn 2003, Spring 2004, Autumn 2004.125 
 
Only 23 % of all Europeans acknowledge a positive role for the U.S. in spreading 
world peace. Concerning the German burden in international affairs, a steady increase 
                                                 
125 The questions answered in Table 2 and 3 were not part of the Eurobarometer before or afterwards. 
Therefore the percentages show only the data of the available years. See: European Commission, 
“Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, No. 61, 62, 63,“Umfragezeitraum 2001 to 2006,” 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/, (accessed May 1, 2007). 
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from 1997 to 2001 can be interpreted that Germans are satisfied with the responsibility 
Germany shares in the international environment. 65 % of all Germans think that its role 
is appropriate. But also a steady increase in the same timeframe from 1997 to 2001 notes 
that 12 % in 1997 to 17 % in 2001 demand a greater role for Germany in international 
affairs. Therefore one can see that in total 81 % of Germans vote for an active role of 
their country in foreign policy issues.126 In tandem, a pan-European identification is 
evolving. Concerning the latest results, 59 % of Germans and 54 % of all European 
members would appreciate a development from the existing European Union towards a 
complete political Union. During the timeframe Spring 2002 to Autumn 2004 the 
Germans were asked about their personal identity. Do they view themselves as both 
Germans and Europeans, only as Germans, as Europeans first place and then as Germans, 
or solely as Europeans.  
Table 4.   Germans asked how they identify themselves: German and European, 
German, European and German, or just as a European.  German (GER), 
European (EU). 
 




EB 58  
Autumn 2002 
EB 59  
Spring 2003 
EB 60  
Autumn 2003 
EB 61  
Spring 2004 




43% 47% 45% 45% 46% 53% 
GER 39% 37% 34% 38% 43% 31% 
EU & 
GER 
10% 10% 12% 10% 8% 10% 
EU 6% 3% 6% 4% 6% 5% 
Eurobaromter (EB): 
Spring 2002, Autumn 2002, Spring 2003, Autumn 2003, Spring 2004, Autumn 2004127 
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In general one can see that the Germans identify themselves more and more with the 
European Union. In total we can see that 94 % see themselves as Europeans, Germans 
and Europeans, or Europeans and Germans. A decline can be acknowledged in the 
importance of solely German identification during recent years whereas the European 
Union became more and more important concerning the issue of security and defense as 
well as in the area of personal identification. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The change in the global security environment forced both institutions, NATO as 
well as the EU, to change their strategic capabilities. A nationalization of the German 
security policy did not take part due to its willingness to cooperate through NATO and 
the European Union as well as its unwillingness to increase its defense expenditure. The 
agreements to enhance its capabilities within NATO and the EU are comparative. 
Germany as a member of the EU took over a significant lead in primary areas of 
transformation including strategic airlift, satellite intelligence, and combat search and 
rescue. The NATO attempt to increase the European capabilities was undertaken to 
enhance interoperability as well as to enable the Europeans to share a more equal burden 
in future conflicts. These capabilities have become well enhanced in the realm of the 
ESDP, and this has probably fostered a more independent European Security and Defense 
Policy. Concerning the German identification with a NATO, the EU, or a national 
defense identity one can observe that the European Union is favored by most Germans. 
Due to traditional sources of past discord as well as the mixed fortunes of U.S. policy in 
the present decade, the U.S. has lost a lot of its credibility in the European Union and 
especially in Germany. This fact furthermore fosters the pursuit for more independence. 
The Germans not only distrust NATO in its purpose and authority but also believe that 
the EU is the more trustworthy institution concerning security issues. Together with the 
broader realm of capabilities of the EU in peace building, NATO is under serious 
pressure to retain its status as the main security pillar in Europe. An evolution towards 
more civilian-military capabilities together with a Europeanization might ensure its 
survivability. With the results of the Eurobarometers in mind, one can hardly imagine 
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that a Europeanization of NATO is unavoidable. The EU developed as a backup 
institution for many European states, and enjoys a huge amount of legitimacy and trust 
within German society as well as among Europeans. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
After the Second World War, despite the horror of total war and genocide, bty the 
final decades of the 20th century, a process of emancipation of Germany in the political 
realm can be observed. Its influence, particularly economic, grew through the years. Any 
independence was strictly avoided due to the threat of the Soviet Union towards the 
process of democratization within western Germany and because of the burden of 
national division into east and west. The transatlantic link was one of the major defense 
priorities of the Federal Republic of Germany, more important than reunification of 
Germany throughout the years of the Cold War. Surely this changed dramatically after 
the years of 1989 and 1990. Germany woke up from its Doernroeschenschlaf or sleeping 
beauty slumber, thereby facing tremendous internal problems to work through concerning 
its future position in the realm of western security. The external demand for a greater 
German role in conflicts like the second Gulf War 1990-1991 did not fit in the as of yet 
un formed defense identity of the German nation after reunification. From this phase of 
evolving and slowly developing national awareness one can see that national interests 
cannot be formed without a common national identity. Where the administration under 
Helmut Kohl made decisive commitments to maintain Germany integrated within NATO 
and to foster cooperation especially with the U.S., a change in trans-Atlantic paradigms 
can be acknowledged after Gerhard Schroeder took over the administration. Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl integrated the German armed forces even deeper in the transatlantic security 
community by establishing the German-American Brigade, the American-German 
Brigade, the German-Netherlands Corps, and the decision against the French attempt to 
get the NATO command post for the Mediterranean. 
But all these decisions were made during the time when the reunification of 
Germany was the most important issue to German politicians. The ethnic cleansing of the 
Balkan Wars together with the pressure of the NATO members forced Germany to share 
the burden with its western allies to end the immoral acts happening in the Balkans. The 
lack of military capabilities was a traumatic experience for many of the European states 
which participated in the NATO-led war in the Balkans. However, this triggered the 
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British-French attempt to accelerate the development of a European Defense and Security 
Policy. As we have seen, different aims were at stake for Britain as well as for France. 
These developments pushed Germany to recognize that its geographic position, its 
economic power, and its historical experiences were issues of which other countries were 
far more aware, and demanding that Germany integrate into the European dimension of 
common security issues in future conflicts and wars. The ethnic cleansing during the 
Balkan Wars confronted Germany with a dilemma between consequences from the past 
and the shape of the future. The expectations of “never again war” and “never any 
German armed forces on foreign soils of Europe again” had governed the indefinite 
future. But politics could not diminish Germany’s moral role as one of the central powers 
of Europe. A question of morals and ethics finally forced Germany to participate in the 
common efforts of NATO to stabilize the region of central eastern Europe. 
But with the ongoing process of a common European Defense and Security Policy 
a new era required that Germany had to find its place in this development. Competing 
loyalties could be observed in the fact that Germany, together with France and even 
outside the European Union tried to enhance the development of a more independent 
ESDP during the Schroeder administration. Surely the links to NATO continued to exist, 
but the realm in which the EU is willing to operate covers more than the aspects focused 
on by NATO. An institution developed, and still is in progress, which actually only lacks 
the military capabilities in order to be similar on one hand and even more advanced on 
the other hand to NATO. With the development of recent years a split in the preferences 
of different means and ends can be traced. A general split can be seen in the development 
that the Europeans and especially the Germans are very much in favor of diplomatic and 
civilized means to solve conflicts. A deep distrust of German society towards NATO, and 
especially the U.S., has developed over the past decades. Concerning issues of security, 
Germans do not trust NATO in general, and as evidence cited  in the last chapter shows,  
the U.S. has lost a huge amount of credibility. Therefore, the Iraq war and the differences 
between George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder are not only an issue of a lack of 
sympathy but also a generational change in the German society. The increasing  
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identification with Europe together with the European military missions which are 
perceived as successful acknowledge an even deeper split between both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
With the U.S. demand that the European nations should enhance their military 
capabilities to share a greater burden within NATO, a more equal say and more 
efficiency should be gained within NATO. As described in this thesis the development of 
NATO and the EU are very congruent in their attempt to increase their military 
capabilities. But this also could be seen as the opening of Pandora’s Box. If these 
developments finally allow the Europeans to be more equal in military terms to the U.S., 
there might be no need to consider NATO as the only security institution to solve future 
conflicts. All developments of the European capabilities indicate that Europe is willing to 
develop its own security institution to operate more autonomously. 
Taking this consideration together with the polls of the European Commission of 
the last seven years, as documented in the previous chapter, we become aware that a 
political change in NATO is necessary. Only if NATO is able to integrate the full 
spectrum of civil-military capabilities of the EU will it be able to reassert its influence. 
These issues are particularly relevant given the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The vision of German society shows clearly that an increasing identification with 
Europe is taking place, and further distrust of the actual Bush administration accelerates 
this development. A rift between support for soft- and hard-power is growing; in view of 
the experience of the Cold War, the common history, and the shared values on both sides 
of the Atlantic, this situation should be fixed immediately. 
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